

Recommendations for the Next National Security Strategy:

Collaborative Leadership for a Multi-Polar World

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Introduction

The 21st Century continues to hold much promise for the United States and the world. Free market reforms, technological advances, and the development of state economies that rival the United States in scale and level of influence are ushering in a multi-polar world. While reactionary forces fear that the rise of other nations will challenge U.S. power and influence, their growth does not necessarily undermine U.S. vital interests. Competition does not have to result in confrontation. Since the end of World War II, the U.S. has played a distinct and consequential role in shaping the world, winning the Cold War and contributing significantly to the creation of an international system through which most nations have benefitted.ⁱ These achievements have not been without cost. The United States has spent inordinate amounts of blood and treasure to sustain its responsibilities as the global leader.ⁱⁱ Furthermore, occasional American over-reach, lack of support to international norms and institutions, and perceived global inequities cast doubt on the quality and commitment of U.S. leadership. Therefore, it is time to reconsider the form and application of U.S. leadership in the world.

The emergence of multi-polarity presents a choice for the United States: to resist it, and attempt to maintain hegemony for as long as possible; to retrench, passively allowing multi-polarity to develop separate from U.S. leadership; or to embrace and shape the multi-polar world to U.S. interests. The next National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS) should focus on the third option.

The NSS provides the President an opportunity to communicate the nation's strategic vision and priorities.ⁱⁱⁱ The next NSS gives the United States a fresh opportunity

to address the ways it can best shape a peaceful and prosperous multi-polar future through the application of American wealth, influence, and power. Recognizing the coming multi-polar world marks a significant departure in how the U.S. views the international environment. This recognition also changes how the U.S. will engage within the international environment. The goal of this document is to help define that change by providing recommendations to the next NSS drafters.

In the past, the concept of national security has been inflated to include any policy objective that has any conceivable national security implication, no matter how tenuous. This has degraded the United States' ability to focus, resource, and prioritize instruments of national power.^{iv} For example, the military instrument has all-too-often been applied to achieve U.S. goals that were better suited for other instruments, such as diplomacy or economic engagement. To best shape the multi-polar world to our interests, these instruments must be brought back into balance.

National security is achieved when the United States can defend its vital interests. Vital interests are non-negotiable because they are key to preserving the American way of life.^v In the context of the emerging multi-polar world, and harkening back to the original 1987 NSS, U.S. vital national interests are:

- The continuation of the “United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values and institutions intact.”
- The strength and well-being of the U.S. economic system.
- “A stable and secure world, free of [existential] threats to U.S. interests.”^{vi}

While the U.S. continues to lead the world in economic prominence, its fiscal position – as influenced by ongoing budgetary impasses, high levels of non-

discretionary spending, and a desire for retrenchment by selected elements of both political parties – limits instruments of national power and makes the maintenance of global hegemony unrealistic. In addition to these domestic pressures, the international system is changing. The manner in which the U.S. has sought to maintain hegemony since the end of the Cold War has eroded confidence in U.S. leadership and caused some states to view any alternative as the better course.^{vii} At the regional and in some cases the global level, other countries are well-positioned to assume leadership and may surpass U.S. capacity in certain aspects of national power.^{viii} Globalization has spawned increasing interdependence and has increased the number of issues requiring global action by the international community as a whole. Within the international community, other states are demanding a greater stake in the international system, which is expressed by the increasing influence and credibility of their own security and cooperative economic arrangements. The challenge facing the United States is to use these new realities to fashion a better international system that meets its vital interests.

Multi-polarity can imply a world order of “Great Power” rivalries that were so destructive for much of the 20th Century.^{ix} Given this tragic history, “Great Power” is a loaded term; accordingly, it and other labels– peer/near-peer competitors, major powers, emerging powers, etc. – are subsumed into the term **consequential powers**. Consequential powers are those that have developed and attained influence and import either at the global or regional level to the extent that their interests and actions cannot be ignored or quickly dispatched. These powers include states like China, Russia, and India, as well as a regional bloc like the European Union, which have achieved their respective stations in the relatively stable, prosperous, and peaceful world order. In a

world of reconsidered U.S. leadership and with fiscal constraints expected to be an abiding facet of U.S. policy-making, consequential powers have an inherent responsibility to advance global peace, stability, and prosperity.

It is imperative to recognize that consequential powers will not necessarily be aligned with the U.S., or welcoming of U.S. leadership. Consequential powers will compete, yet are not necessarily equal in power to each other or to the United States. Nonetheless, as the architect of the current world order, the United States remains best positioned to manage this competition.^x Competition need not be inherently dangerous or belligerent. If the United States believes in the world order that it helped to create and aspires to lead, it should welcome consequential powers that also aspire to lead if committed to the maintenance of international peace and stability. In this light, the U.S. will be a collaborative leader.

While such **collaborative leadership** will hopefully enhance global security and prosperity, the U.S. must retain the capability, flexibility, and the political and popular will to defend its vital interests. As any sovereign and independent nation, the United States reserves the right to defend its vital interests with the full weight of all instruments of national power.^{xi} The ability to unilaterally safeguard vital interests provides the U.S. with greater credibility when dealing with consequential powers.

Collaborative leadership of a multi-polar world will seek to co-opt non-participating consequential powers into a peaceful and stable world order, sharing responsibility, cost, and risk to solve global issues, thereby increasing mutual benefit and prosperity. However, if consequential powers threaten peace and stability, they will be confronted through broad coalitions of like-minded states and institutions.

U.S. leadership will remain the essential currency in a new multi-polar world order even as consequential powers are encouraged to step forward. To collaboratively lead while simultaneously securing its vital national interests, and as a consequential power itself, the United States must perform the following roles:

1. Support and strengthen the international system;
2. Promote international peace and stability;
3. Enhance global prosperity; and,
4. Advocate solutions to issues of global concern.

The remainder of this document will expound upon these roles, with associated policy recommendations.

Collaborative Leadership to Support and Strengthen the International System

Since the current international system's establishment after World War II, the world has experienced extraordinary economic development and avoided the major violent conflicts that marked the first half of the 20th Century.^{xii} In light of these achievements, the international order

under U.S. leadership has been in the best interest of the international community and the United States both. To increase the legitimacy of its collaborative leadership and to strengthen collective belief in the international order, the United States must be

U.S. Recommendations at a Glance

- Maintain leadership of the international system.
- Increase legitimacy of collaborative leadership by focusing on moral authority.
- Ratify the UNCLOS and Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions.

consistent in promoting international law, self-determination, and respect for the principles of sovereignty and equal rights.^{xiii}

International norms and institutions provide standards of conduct and behavior for states to follow. These standards enable the international community to predict behavior and actions; the alternative is erratic behavior that can have a destabilizing effect. As a collaborative leader within the extant international system, the United States is able to set standards, encourage participation, and shape the system itself. Shunning the international system will create a power vacuum that a non-cooperative consequential power will eagerly fill.^{xiv}

The international system's norms and institutions are defined by a legal architecture that outlines how states treat each other, as well as how states treat individuals inside their boundaries. Within this architecture are specific laws and conventions that prescribe the conduct of war, protect human rights, and regulate the global commons.^{xv} The legitimacy of U.S. collaborative leadership is undermined when other states do not believe that the United States is complying with the international legal architecture. This occurred with the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which critics claim was contrary to established international humanitarian law and was undertaken without explicit U.N. Security Council authorization. In contrast, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan was widely supported in a manner consistent with the historic view of U.S. military dominance as having "relatively benign intentions."^{xvi}

When the United States acts in accordance with the international legal architecture, its moral authority is strengthened and it gains respect as a legitimate collaborative leader. The U.S. earns legitimacy when working through the United

Nations, which has proven able to prevent the spread of aggression and to maintain stability.^{xvii} The 1991 liberation of Kuwait and the Sinai Multinational Force and Observers mission are successful examples of the U.S. working in conjunction with the U.N. to check aggression and provide stability.

Another area where the United States can strengthen its legitimacy is by ratifying international treaties or conventions that it has previously signed or otherwise supported. Foremost among these is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The UNCLOS protects international security and economic interests through a comprehensive legal framework governing the use of oceans. It has enjoyed varying degrees of political, military, and industry support since its amendment in 1994, and has been invoked by The Hague to adjudicate territorial disputes within the South China Sea and other key international waterways. As such, the UNCLOS can be used to manage competition among consequential powers.^{xviii} However, U.S. failure to ratify the treaty undercuts its legitimacy to invoke UNCLOS standards, especially given that the U.S. is the world's foremost naval power and putative regulator of the global maritime commons.

The United States has also signed, but not ratified, Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.^{xix} These provide “that armed conflicts in which people are fighting against colonial domination, alien occupation, or racist regimes are to be considered international conflicts” under the Geneva Conventions.^{xx} The United States has recognized substantial portions of Additional Protocol I as customary international law. However, it has also identified specific provisions that are not, including: the applicability of Additional Protocol I to wars of national liberation; the prohibition on means or

methods of warfare intended or expected to cause severe damage to the environment; and the prohibition on targeting dikes, dams, and nuclear power stations. While the United States has consistently objected to these provisions, current U.S. military policies abide by them.^{xxi} Thus, the questionable benefit of preserving untenable tactical options is clearly outweighed by increased U.S. moral authority that would come through ratification of this protocol. Of the 174 state parties to Additional Protocol I, three have signed, but not ratified – Iran, Pakistan, and the United States.^{xxii} If the United States were to ratify Additional Protocol I, its standing as the collaborative leader would be enhanced.

Collaborative leadership requires the United States to cede some of its sovereign authority. Although understandably unpopular with part of the domestic population, there exists an inherent tension between sovereignty and stewardship of the international system. In sum, U.S. advantages gained through increased legitimacy within the international system outweigh any limitation of sovereignty. While it may not be appropriate to sign and ratify all international treaties given this tension, the ratification of the UNCLOS and Additional Protocol I would be a first step to strengthen U.S. moral authority and legitimacy.

Collaborative Leadership to Promote International Peace and Stability

American leadership and the liberal world order it has underwritten have arguably led to the longest period of peace between consequential powers since at least the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.^{xxiii} By working with allies, partners, and key institutions to deter foreign aggression and intervene when deterrence fails, the United States has promoted stability and the rule of law. This

U.S. Recommendations at a Glance

- Seek collaboration with China on containing volatile Russia and DPRK.
- Strengthen counter-proliferation efforts.
- Diversify employment of non-military instruments of power to confront malign non-state actors.
- Encourage regional solutions to solve governance and rule of law issues that create fragile states.

peace and the underlying order require stabilizers if they are to be sustained. In a multi-polar reality, the world will expect the United States to demonstrate collaborative leadership with other consequential powers to enhance stability. If the United States does not recognize the need to share power and work in concert with other consequential powers, the world is likely to seek alternative leadership. This would be unfortunate, not only for the United States' ability to secure its vital national interests, but for the world's ability to increase peace and prosperity for all. For, while the character of our leadership style may change over time with shifts in the world order, the United States' engagement remains critical for a better world order and the future that it promises.

While the end of the Cold War and the relative success of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (commonly known as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT) provides a tenuous and temporary comfort, the threat of nuclear conflict

increases with every new nuclear weapon state.^{xxiv} Furthermore, each addition makes the calculus of deterrence increasingly complex. Collaboratively led vigilance – and unilateral action, if necessary – must continue to outpace the efforts of terrorist organizations and other malign non-state actors to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Ultimately, there is no enemy more dangerous than one who cannot be deterred by retaliation or subsequent annihilation.

Although the world is enjoying an unprecedented period of peace between major powers, a “better peace” would be one without nuclear weapons.^{xxv} This remains highly aspirational, so a better peace with nuclear consequential powers must be sought in other ways. Our work with Russia in particular regarding the mutual reduction of nuclear stockpiles must continue. Russian belligerence in Georgia and eastern Ukraine, coupled with their stated intent to not comply with the New START, challenges global stability and the continued effectiveness of nuclear deterrence.^{xxvi} Russian behavior also invites questions about their risk aversion and commitment to existing treaty obligations. An insecure Russia presents grave risks to the world economy, China, the United States, and its allies. Future policy towards Russia may have to borrow from the strategy of containment, with other consequential powers playing a pivotal role in controlling the vitriolic actions of a less interconnected and more hostile Russia.

Russia is not the only nuclear state of concern. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea undermined stability in the Pacific when it became an unlawful nuclear state. Although North Korea is isolated from much of the rest of the world, their nuclear program and the unpredictability of the Kim Jong Un regime pose significant threats to regional order and stability. As the primary sponsor of the Kim regime and the

most consequential power in East Asia, China has the responsibility to serve as the international agent for nonproliferation and counter-proliferation within their sphere of influence. If China proves unable or unwilling to do so, the United States must collaboratively lead mitigation of the North Korean threat with other East Asian consequential powers.^{xxvii} This would include improving Japan's ballistic missile defense infrastructure. Additionally, the U.S. must maintain the will and capacity in theater to act if North Korean weapons of mass destruction ever pose a clear and present existential threat to the United States and its allies. Effective counter-proliferation requires that the United States retain a robust capability to rapidly identify, pursue, and neutralize the trafficking of WMD-related materiel and information, unilaterally if necessary.

In addition to efforts in East Asia, the United States should work alongside others to strengthen the NPT and to garner broad international support for the Proliferation Security Initiative. Despite criticism of some of its tenets, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Iranian nuclear program demonstrates that collaborative leadership to counter proliferation of nuclear weapons is a viable approach.^{xxviii} Strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify compliance would make such approaches even more viable, as would the U.S. further increasing intelligence sharing to improve counter-proliferation efforts at the regional level.^{xxix}

Malign non-state actors – often taking the form of violent extremist organizations with global reach – continue to threaten their respective regions. While all instruments of national power should be made available to counter malign non-state actors and terrorism, recent military interventions demonstrate that the United States should be more circumspect in the use of the military instrument.^{xxx} While capable, the military

instrument is blunt and often not most effective in managing low-level conflicts. The military instrument is best reserved as an option of last resort. Misapplication of military force can amplify the narrative of Western imperialism, as well as set conditions for a proverbial quagmire that has ill-defined objectives and unintended consequences. Accordingly, the United States must always seek to use existing alliances and regional security apparatuses to counter malign non-state actors and terrorism. Strengthened regional arrangements will prevent further deterioration of fragile states and the rise of malign non-state actors to regional or global prominence.^{xxx} This approach will also force better burden and cost sharing within alliances and regional arrangements, thereby reducing “free ridership” of U.S. security.

At the regional level, malign non-state actors can be countered through locally-developed systems of governance that allow for representation of various religious sects and ethnic groups. Governance can be hamstrung by sectarian proxy groups, however; sponsorship and use of these groups by state actors must also be countered, which will in turn limit their influence. The United States can also promote good governance through greater direct assistance to willing states that are committed to the principles of self-determination and equitable prosperity.^{xxx} Tailored relationships of this kind are a vital mechanism to slow the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, isolate oppressive political regimes, and better assist fragile states.

Fragile states are generally regional problems that require regional responses, since the causes of fragility are highly contextual. The political, economic, and social instability characteristic of fragile states can spread beyond their borders, causing regional unrest and potentially harming U.S. national interests.^{xxx} Moreover, grievances

over poor governance in these regions can galvanize extremist groups and transnational criminal organizations to take advantage of institutional weaknesses, underdevelopment, and poverty.

International institutions are a key mechanism for promoting development and stability in fragile states. While globalization has been a boon to strong economies worldwide, struggling states with little means to partake in the benefits of a globalized economy have been left even further behind, causing the gap between haves and have-nots to widen.^{xxxiv} These struggling states can create regional instability, and it is the responsibility of consequential powers to ensure equitable peace and prosperity to counter such volatility. This is in alignment with the post-2015 United Nations development agenda, which calls for a “revitalized global partnership” to service these and similar interests.^{xxxv}

Collaborative Leadership to Enhance Global Prosperity

The United States has played an increasingly important role in the global economy since the end of the 19th Century, from the opening of the United States to global markets, to development of the Bretton Woods system, to becoming the world’s biggest economy with outsized influence on all aspects of global trade and regulation. Continued U.S. economic growth, coupled with increasing interconnectedness with consequential

U.S. Recommendations at a Glance

- Lead economically, shape globalization.
- Embrace free markets and seek free trade agreements.
- Decrease vulnerability at home and amongst partner nations through energy security.

powers, strengthens American security and that of international economic partners and allies.^{xxxvi}

The United States must continue its leadership of the global economy to maintain the relative peace among consequential powers and to increase shared prosperity as a way to stabilize the emerging multi-polar world. Free global trade increases the potential for peace and prosperity for all nations, since access issues associated with markets and resources have been a central cause of conflict in previous eras. Free trade has cut the extreme global poverty rate in half since 1990.^{xxxvii} Per capita GDP continues to grow in developing countries, and as the socio-economic status of these states rise, violence decreases and a more stable world order is created. The U.S. can enhance global prosperity by continuing to shape the course of free trade through its influential participation in institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Group of Twenty (G20), and World Bank.

With the preeminence of its currency and financial institutions, the United States is the backbone of the world economic order. Since the founding of the IMF in 1944 and the end of World War II a year later, U.S. leadership has furthered development, lowered the price of goods, raised average income, promoted U.S. values, and advanced international law and order.^{xxxviii} U.S. economic leadership also provides a powerful foreign policy tool for resolving conflict short of military intervention. In light of the benefits for all, the United States must retain global economic leadership. In recognition of the realities of an increasingly multi-polar world, however, and to prevent this leadership from becoming a vehicle for hegemony, U.S. leadership should be more collaborative. Collaborative leadership demands active engagement in international

organizations, participation in trade negotiations, protection of the U.S. dollar as the world's reserve currency, and peacefully defending interdependence against protectionist urges both domestically and internationally.

Keeping the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency is connected to U.S. vital national interests; it allows the government to borrow at low rates, unchecked to support national security and domestic goals.^{xxxix} While there is currently no accepted challenger to the U.S. dollar, the rise of China and even India may eventually erode the dollar's utility in the eyes of other consequential powers. The best way to defend the U.S. dollar is to maintain a strong domestic economic system and a mutually beneficial global economic order.^{xl} If other consequential powers do not have cause to change the world reserve currency, then they likely will not seek one.

Greater interconnectedness within the global economy increases shared risk, with the global economic order potentially threatened by deleterious actions within another nation's sovereign banks or markets. To reinforce the international financial and economic systems, the United States should collaboratively lead the development of a comprehensive risk management plan that is informed by best practices and other lessons identified from the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.^{xli} This includes putting our domestic house in order with the implementation and enforcement of stronger banking standards on Wall Street, which will prevent unduly high-risk leverage and speculative behavior.

Although the United States is the preeminent global economic power, China's growing economic clout cannot be discounted. However, the United States must ratify the Trans-Pacific Partnership or a successor free trade agreement for East Asia. Failure

to do so would create a significant disadvantage for U.S. economic leadership in the emerging multi-polar world. Given the stakes, economic competition with China will be the norm in the multi-polar world.^{xlii} As previously stated, competition need not mean confrontation. Therefore, the U.S. should work with China through international economic institutions to encourage greater transparency with its trade practices and monetary policy.

Cooperation with China is not without precedent, even in contentious settings like the maritime domain. For example, China and other consequential powers have been highly cooperative in securing sea-based commerce against piracy.^{xliii} This is significant because the maritime domain is the largest medium of global trade, accounting for over 90% of the current volume.^{xliiv} Emerging maritime powers must be peacefully brought into a mutually beneficial order to stave off the destabilizing effects of competition. As the world's preeminent economic and naval power, the U.S. should encourage cooperation, which can serve as a springboard for greater mutual trust and economic benefit. If consequential powers share responsibility and become equal stakeholders for ensuring rule-based access to international waterways, then security increases.

Much of current U.S. economic strength comes from the information technology (IT) sector, which arguably has the greatest societal impact throughout the global economy. U.S.-based IT companies position the United States as a vital hub of business and social communication for the rest of the world, thereby providing an informational advantage. Deepening links between public, private, and academic entities within the domestic IT sector will better enable the United States to lead change in response to the world's most daunting security, intelligence, and cyber threats.

Another area of U.S. economic strength is its defense industry. U.S. companies produce some of the world's highest quality and most sought-after military equipment and provide a decisive technological edge to the military instrument of United States national power. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) serve as an avenue to deepen international ties, and enable interoperability for security cooperation and contingency operations.^{xiv} To these ends, the contribution of FMS to U.S. national security is significantly deeper than the \$47 billion of annual revenues – the way it binds partnered states together under the banner of common equipment is a tangible representation of collaborative leadership.^{xlv}

To fully enable collaborative leadership through FMS, however, the process itself must be streamlined to ensure responsive support to partnered consequential powers as they confront regional security challenges. Delays in the FMS process degrade the perception of American credibility and can spur frustrated partners to seek equipment from less constrained sellers from other countries. Furthermore, without buyers, the U.S. military industrial base cannot continue to innovate, which is critical to maintaining a technological advantage over unfriendly or neutral consequential powers.^{xlvii}

Economic strength is closely tied to energy security, and will remain so in the multi-polar world. Since 2008, the United States has significantly increased its domestic energy production in response to global uncertainty by integrating technologically advanced and environmentally responsible methods to extract “tight” sources.^{xlviii}

Coupled with advances in sustainable energy production, this has reduced dependence on foreign oil imports, and made the United States less beholden to market conditions dictated by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). With energy

independence comes greater ability to reduce unilateral security interests in the Middle East particularly.

Energy security enables global stability. The very technological advances which have drastically recast the U.S. energy landscape are essential to all nations achieving similar levels of energy security. The export of advanced energy technology not only benefits U.S. companies, but also enables partners to insulate themselves from periodic yet always painful disruptions to global energy supplies. A stable global energy environment benefits all except those who would seek to profit from instability. Thus, the United States must seek to increase stability of the global energy environment.

Stability of the global energy environment not only includes continued development of renewable energy sources, but also responsible exploitation of existing supplies as well as increasing refining capacity to reduce the potential of future supply shocks. In order to effectively use the energy that is imported or produced, it is imperative that the U.S. secures and modernizes its power grid, ideally as a component of a broader infrastructure revitalization effort. The United States should also prepare for the future by promoting viable technologies worldwide that reduce consumption, such as electric and driverless vehicles, superconducting materials, and nuclear fusion-based energy production.

The U.S. agricultural sector is a source of both economic strength and global stability. The United States has the most arable land in the world, with a multi-faceted and highly robust infrastructure network to deliver agricultural goods to global markets. Despite the fact that fewer Americans work in the agricultural sector year-over-year, the U.S. demonstrates global economic leadership in agriculture technology, machinery,

and food exports.^{xlix} In 2014, just over one million American farm workers exported \$153 billion worth of agricultural goods, with a substantial portion flowing to the global middle class in places like China and the European Union.^l This dependency increases U.S. influence over global affairs, which in turn allows U.S. agricultural expertise to have a stabilizing effect on the global economic order. Not only can agricultural expertise directly redress food insecurity in the developing world and for fragile states, but it can also help to stay ahead of anticipated food and water scarcity. Although technology is not a panacea, it has solved all past presumed resource “shocks.” Investment in agricultural technology today represents an investment in economic and sociological stability for the future.

Collaborative Leadership to Advocate Solutions to Issues of Global Concern

The emerging multi-polar world faces issues of global concern that require collaborative leadership. Prominent among these is climate change. The 2015 National Security Strategy sufficiently captures the negative effects associated with climate change, including a shrinking polar ice cap, rising sea levels, and increased frequency of severe weather.^{li} The effects of climate change can quickly lead to regional instability and pose a direct threat to U.S. national security.

U.S. Recommendations at a Glance

- Incentivize development of newer, cleaner power and waste reduction technologies.
- Develop international risk mitigation regimes for disaster response.
- Focus global health regime on pandemic threats, implement Global Health Initiative.
- Develop norms for cyber, non-weaponization of space, and AI.

The current U.S. approach to mitigate the effects of climate change is largely centered on the reduction of harmful emissions, and compliance with key components of the Kyoto Protocol, Doha Amendment, and Paris Agreement has inherent value. This approach has only achieved incremental and suboptimal results, however, with contrivances such as cap and trade being easily exploitable internationally.^{lii} Instead, the U.S. needs to work with consequential powers to better balance global economic development with environmental protection and stewardship of natural resources. In addition to clean energy technology, the U.S. should further promote development of waste reduction techniques and environmental protection solutions that can compete financially with legacy energy production in the long term. To reduce vulnerability to the harmful effects of climate change, the U.S. should sponsor international organizations to share the burdens of disaster response and risk management, both globally and at the regional level. Prime examples of such initiatives within the Western Hemisphere include the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility, the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency, and the Canadian Caribbean Disaster Risk Management Fund. Additionally, the U.S. should foster multi-lateral agreements to exercise and coordinate global crisis prevention, response, and mitigation strategies.

The threat of pandemics is another issue of global concern that requires prevention, response, and mitigation. Pathogens such as the Ebola, Zika, and influenza viruses threaten all nations, regardless of development. Due to rapid global travel, disease can spread at unprecedented rates, limiting the effectiveness of domestic-focused prevention measures. While the U.S. maintains a relatively robust public health system, its infrastructure and supply chain is economized and not equipped to handle

the demands of global pandemic response.^{liii} Accordingly, the United States should seek synergy between the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), as well as other elements of the domestic disease response enterprise. A collaboratively led, combined approach such as the Global Health Initiative (GHI) is necessary for improved disease prevention, response, and mitigation at the international level.^{liv} Approaches like the GHI would also have the ancillary benefit of focusing the WHO on pandemic threats, as opposed to broad-based health and development policies.^{lv}

As an emerging global commons, the cyber domain requires norms and standards that are best developed collaboratively. The security of information, integrity of networks, and rule-based global cooperation against damaging cyberattacks should be a priority in both international and public-private partnerships. The UN Group of Government Experts (UN GGE) is a mechanism to develop international norms on cyberspace; the United States should support this effort, both to secure national interests, as well as to increase the legitimacy of its leadership of the international system.^{lvi} Collaboration on cyberspace needs to address state-developed cyberweapons. Proliferation of these types of weapons is a concern, as weaponized code can be modified to attack U.S. vital interests.^{lvii}

The potential weaponization of space is another proliferation concern that requires U.S. collaborative leadership. The existing Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) and the Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and Threat to Use of Force in Outer Space (PPWT) agreements may be insufficient for the current environment, particularly with increased dependence of militaries on satellite-

based location, communications, and intelligence systems. Also, the increase in space-faring nations has led to competition and congestion, with over 18,000 human-made objects in orbit, controlled by approximately 40 countries.^{lviii} Accordingly, the United States should support establishment of a space ‘Code of Conduct,’ which would provide an opportunity to continue to build positive relations with consequential powers in areas of shared interest.^{lix} In order credibly lead this change, however, the United States must re-invest in launch and space vehicle technologies. While dependence on private enterprises such as Space-X serves a purpose, over-reliance can be self-limiting and degrades our authority as a space leader.

The development of artificial intelligence (AI) is a related issue that demands U.S. collaborative leadership to ensure that the development proceeds safely, responsibly, and transparently. The threat associated with accidental development of a sentient AI or other “superintelligent” machines that can rapidly improve and replicate themselves is highly credible, forecasted by Stephen Hawking, Bill Gates, and Elon Musk, among others. In addition, AI-enabled autonomous weapon systems have the potential to fundamentally change the nature of armed conflict. Much of the current AI-related research occurs within private enterprise or Chinese-funded labs, meaning that AI development will likely proceed unaligned with or in outright opposition to U.S. national security interests. Thus, the longer the U.S. waits to regulate AI research via collaborative leadership, the more likely competition will lead to confrontation – with the U.S. at a disadvantage.^{lx}

Conclusion – Collaborative Leadership for our Posterity

The world is changing, with or without the United States. The United States must confront this reality and choose to use its wealth, power, and influence to embrace the coming multi-polar world order, and shape it to be peaceful, prosperous, and secure. As the world order evolves, the requirement for U.S. leadership remains constant. U.S. leadership is the essential currency to strengthen the international system, promote peace and stability for all, enhance global prosperity, and advocate solutions to issues of global concern. The next National Security Strategy of the United States must ensure this leadership is collaborative with consequential powers, while guaranteeing that the United States remains a free and independent nation, its economic system stays strong and healthy, and that the world is free of existential threats. May this document provide a useful start.

ⁱ “Just as America helped to determine the course of the 20th century, we must now build the sources of American strength and influence, and shape an international order capable of overcoming the challenges of the 21st century.”

<http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2010.pdf>

Barack H. Obama, *National Security Strategy*, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, May 2010), 1.

ⁱⁱ “The U.S. has accounted for 22 percent of the total regular budget [of the United Nations] every year since 2000, and will now continue to do so for the next three years.”

Patrick Goodenough, “U.S. Taxpayers Will Continue to Pay More Than One-Fifth of U.N. Budget,” *CNS News Online*, December 28, 2012, <http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/us-taxpayers-will-continue-pay-more-one-fifth-un-budget> (accessed December 1, 2016).

ⁱⁱⁱ “Each national security strategy report shall set forth the national security strategy of the United States and shall include a comprehensive description and discussion of the following: (1) The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States.”

50 USC § 404A – Annual National Security Strategy Report, <http://nssarchive.us/50-usc-%c2%a7-404a-annual-national-security-strategy-report/> (accessed December 1, 2016).

^{iv} “There is a growing appreciation of the fact that Washington’s willingness to intervene abroad – from Somalia and the Balkans in the 1990s, to Iraq and Afghanistan in the 2000s, to Libya and Yemen in the present decades – has often undermined U.S. security.”

Christopher A. Preble, “New Rules for U.S. Military Intervention,” *War on the Rocks*, posted September 20, 2016, <http://warontherocks.com/2016/09/new-rules-for-u-s-military-intervention/> (accessed November 10, 2016).

^v “Vital interests are those directly connected to the survival, safety, and vitality of our nation. Among these are the physical security of our territory and that of our allies, the safety of our citizens both at home and abroad, protection against WMD proliferation, the economic well-being of our society, and the protection of our critical infrastructures--including energy, banking and finance, telecommunications, transportation, water systems, vital human services, and government services--from disruption intended to cripple their operation. We will do what we must to defend these interests. This may involve the use of military force, including unilateral action, where deemed necessary or appropriate.”

William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age*, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 2000), 5.

^{vi} Ronald Reagan, “The National Security Strategy of the United States,” (Washington, D.C.: The White House, January 1, 1987), 4.

^{vii} John Lewis Gaddis, *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).

^{viii} “The Conference Board estimates that by 2018, China’s contribution to global GDP will surpass that of the U.S. In other words, China’s economy will become more significant than America’s.”

Mike Patton, “China’s Economy Will Overtake the U.S. In 2018,” *Forbes Online*, April 29, 2016, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikepatton/2016/04/29/global-economic-news-china-will-surpass-the-u-s-in-2018/#597b44d474b6> (accessed December 1, 2016).

^{ix} “In the discipline of international relations (IR), a great power is a state which excels in ‘size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence’ (Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 131). These characteristics, also referred as power capabilities, assure a great power the ability to exert its economic, military, political and social influence on a global scale. The distribution of power capabilities in the international system determines the number of

the great powers and, consequently, the polarity of the international system. If the great powers are more than two, the system will be multi-polar; if they are two, it will be bipolar, while systems with only one great power are considered unipolar. By the end of World War II, the multi-polar international system characterized by the pursuit of the balance of power among great powers.”

Andrea Edoardo Varisco, “Towards a Multi-Polar International System: Which Prospects for Global Peace?” *E-International Relations Online*, June 3, 2013, <http://www.e-ir.info/2013/06/03/towards-a-multi-polar-international-system-which-prospects-for-global-peace/> (accessed December 1, 2016).

^x “Yet, the United States is the world leader and likely to remain there for decades. It has the greatest soft power in the world by far.”

Jonathan Adelman, “Why The U.S. Remains the World's Unchallenged Superpower,” *Forbes Online*, November 24, 2013, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/11/24/why-the-u-s-remains-the-worlds-unchallenged-superpower/#2f961bf01fd8> (accessed December 1, 2016).

^{xi} “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.”

”CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION; ARTICLE 51” *Charter of the United Nations*, <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html> (accessed December 1, 2016);

See also, War Powers Act of 1973 – “(c) Presidential executive power as Commander-in-Chief; limitation:

The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.”

War Powers Resolution, Public Law 93-148, § 2, *U.S. Statutes at Large* 87 (1973): 1, codified at *U.S. Code* 50 (1973), § 1541, <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/1541> (accessed December 1, 2016).

^{xii} Ted Piccone, “Is the International Liberal Order Dying? These Five Countries Will Decide,” February 17, 2016, Brookings Institution, document, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/02/17/is-the-international-liberal-order-dying-these-five-countries-will-decide> (accessed November 2, 2016).

^{xiii} *Charter of the United Nations*, Ch. 1 (June 26, 1945).

^{xiv} “Western retrenchment, a deliberate foreign policy reaction to a decade of disappointing foreign wars and severe fiscal challenges, left a global power vacuum prone to destabilizing international competition.

The threadbare nature of world order was exposed by Russia’s annexation of parts of Ukraine, Islamic State (IS)’s conquests in Iraq and Syria, the Gulf states’ military campaign in Yemen, and China’s construction of naval and air bases in disputed parts of the South China Sea. As multilateral initiatives on trade, finance and climate change stumbled, geopolitical blocs such as the BRICS authored rival, parallel institutions. Rising powers and non-state actors – not the traditional Western custodians of global governance – started setting the global agenda.”

Jonathan Wood, “Global Power Dynamics: In 2016, the Pendulum Swings Both Ways,” *Forbes Online*, January 12, 2016, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/riskmap/2016/01/12/global-power-dynamics-in-2016-the-pendulum-swings-both-ways/#60a46b187a16> (accessed December 1, 2016).

^{xv} United Nations, “International Law,” <http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/internationallaw> (accessed November 7, 2016).

^{xvi} Jack Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories,” in *Foreign Policy*, (October 26, 2009).

^{xvii} “Because political orders are social constructs and a product of material and normative forces, the reports focus on how these orders are produced and the struggles that are waged to establish their legitimation principles. ‘Politics is not merely a struggle for power,’ observed Inis Claude, ‘but also a contest over legitimacy, a competition in which the conferment or denial, the confirmation or revocation, of legitimacy is an important stake’ (Claude). Kissinger began his classic *A World Restored* by stating that the central issue for the post-Napoleonic order was the construction of a set of socially recognized and collectively legitimated principles that determines what is permissible and what is prohibited (Kissinger). In many respects, these reports apply Kissinger’s historical concerns to the post-cold war era.”

Michael N. Barnett, “Bringing in the New World Order: Liberalism, Legitimacy, and the United Nations.” *World Politics Online* 49, no. 4 (1997): 526-51. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054018> (accessed December 1, 2016).

^{xviii} “Popular media has largely ignored recent satellite imagery shows that China recently finished construction of an artificial island, helipad, and anti-aircraft tower in the Spratly Islands, a highly contested piece of territory. Given that this is just the most recent episode of a larger push for military construction, it is concerning that Congress has largely failed to engage with the administration’s ‘pivot’ towards East Asia. This restricted debate risks missing an important opportunity to address one of the most baffling deficiencies in America’s East Asia policy: ratifying the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).”

Christopher Mirasola, “Why the US Should Ratify UNCLOS: A View from the South and East China Seas,” *Harvard Law School National Security Journal Online*, March 15, 2015, <http://harvardnsj.org/2015/03/why-the-us-should-ratify-unclos-a-view-from-the-south-and-east-china-seas/> (accessed December 1, 2016);

See also, “Unlike previous territorial disputes put before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea or International Court of Justice in The Hague, this tribunal did not adjudicate on sovereignty. That would have required both parties’ agreement. Furthermore, China’s reservations after ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) against compulsory dispute settlement under the Convention being binding effectively precluded such a direct approach. The Philippines was able to seek arbitration by focusing its case on the legal status of disputed maritime features, rather than a determination on who owns what. On these more limited terms, the Philippines obtained a sweeping victory, with the panel finding unanimously in its favor on almost all fifteen submissions.

The panel found that China’s claims of historic rights within the nine-dash line, which Beijing uses to demarcate its claims in the South China Sea, were without legal foundation. The panel also concluded that Beijing’s activities within the Philippines’ two-hundred-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), such as illegal fishing and environmentally ruinous artificial island construction, infringed on Manila’s sovereign rights.”

Euan Graham, “The Hague Tribunal’s South China Sea Ruling: Empty Provocation or Slow-Burning Influence?” *Council of Councils Online*, November 1, 2016, http://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/global_memos/p38227 (accessed December 1, 2016).

^{xix} “The first Protocol concerned international wars; the second addressed civil wars. The U.S. delegation (in which the Department of Defense was strongly represented), under the able leadership of Ambassador George Aldrich, played an important role in the negotiations. The United States signed both Protocols. In the belief that any problems could be corrected by understandings or reservations, it proceeded to negotiate statements of understanding and reservations with its NATO allies. However, because of fears that Protocol I would legitimize the claims of the Palestine Liberation Organization to prisoner-of-war privileges for its combatants and promote various

liberation movements to state or quasi-state status, the Protocol attracted vigorous opposition in the United States and Israel.”

Theodor Meron, “The Time Has Come for the United States to Ratify Geneva Protocol I,” *The American Journal of International Law Online*, Vol. 88, No. 4 (Oct., 1994), pp. 678-686, www.jstor.org/stable/2204135 (accessed December 1, 2016).

^{xx} Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, The International Committee of the Red Cross, Article 1(4), <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/470> (accessed November 21, 2016).

^{xxi} “Military manuals of major powers such as Germany are based on the Protocol, and even the U.S. Air Force and Navy commanders' handbooks commonly use its language.”

Theodor Meron, “The Time Has Come for the United States to Ratify Geneva Protocol I,” *The American Journal of International Law Online*, Vol. 88, No. 4 (Oct., 1994), pp. 678-686, www.jstor.org/stable/2204135 (accessed December 1, 2016).

^{xxii} International Committee of the Red Cross, “Treaties, State Parties and Commentaries,” <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/intro/470> (accessed November 7, 2016).

^{xxiii} Peter Harris, “Losing the International Order: Westphalia, Liberalism, and Current World Crises,” *The National Interest*, November 10, 2015, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/losing-the-international-order-westphalia-liberalism-current-14298?page=2> (accessed December 1, 2016).

^{xxiv} Council on Foreign Relations, “The Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Issue Brief,” June 25, 2013, <http://www.cfr.org/nonproliferation-arms-control-and-disarmament/global-nuclear-nonproliferation-regime/p18984> (accessed December 1, 2016).

^{xxv} B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy, 2nd Revised Edition*, (New York: The Penguin Group, March, 1991).

^{xxvi} Mark Schneider, “Russian Violations of the INF and New START Treaties,” National Institute for Public Policy, Issue No. 410, August 15, 2016, <http://www.nipp.org/2016/08/15/schneider-mark-russian-violations-of-the-inf-and-new-start-treaties/> (accessed December 1, 2016).

^{xxvii} Jeremy Page and Jay Solomon, “China Warns North Korean Nuclear Threat Is Rising,” *Wall Street Journal*, April 22, 2015, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-warns-north-korean-nuclear-threat-is-rising-1429745706> (accessed December 1, 2016);

See also, Lt.Gen. (USMC) Vincent R. Stewart, “Worldwide Threat Assessment to the Armed Services Committee,” Defense Intelligence Agency, February 3, 2015 <http://www.dia.mil/News/Speeches-and-Testimonies/Article-View/Article/567087/worldwide-threat-assessment/> (accessed December 1, 2016).

^{xxviii} Brian Bennett, “CIA Director Warns Trump it Would be the ‘Height of Folly’ to Scrap the Iran Deal,” *Los Angeles Times*, November 30, 2016, <http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/trailguide/la-na-trailguide-updates-cia-director-warns-trump-it-would-be-1480521775-htmlstory.html> (accessed December 1, 2016);

See also, “The Iran Nuclear Deal: What You Need to Know About the JCPOA,” (Washington, D.C.: The White House), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/jcpoa_what_you_need_to_know.pdf (accessed December 1, 2016).

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^{xxxi} “Stop Conflict, Reduce Fragility and End Poverty: Doing Things Differently in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations,” World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/Feature%20Story/Stop_Conflict_Reduce_Fragility_End_Poverty.pdf (accessed December 1, 2016).

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