Fugitive Sovereignty:
On the Specter of Schmitt in Wolin’s Theory of Democracy

Introduction

It is no exaggeration to say that Sheldon Wolin is a lodestar for American radical democrats, whose political expression is so far best exemplified by the 1960s counterculture movement that marks a break with the conventional understanding of democracy and continues to influence today’s public debate and academic research. Democratic theorists before Wolin—especially those known as “the New Deal thirties” as Wolin refers to them,\(^1\) or “the Reformist Left” as Richard Rorty refers to them\(^2\)—were mainly interested in seeking social justice by means of economic redistribution within the framework of constitutional democracy. Yet their hope in the state ended up entangled with the expansion of American military and corporate power both at home and abroad,\(^3\) which in turn gave birth to its antithesis—a radical form of democratic vision that seeks justice outside the constitutional framework and places the hope for change not on the state but rather on the transgressive and transformative potential of the people. Wolin, one of the leading voices of the latter trend, provides perhaps the most theoretically rich and complex justification of the radical democracy of his era.

Despite the seeming failure of the 60s in the sense that the movements “were generally overlooked by outsiders” and “have been ignored ever since,”\(^4\) the very radicalness of radical democracy deserves a theoretical examination, for even contemporary conservatives could paradoxically dismiss progressive ideals and proclaim themselves as “the real radicals with truly revolutionary ideas.”\(^5\) Clarifying such radicalness is an indispensable step towards answering a critical question that faces whoever wishes to revive Wolin’s legacy in the US

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\(^1\) Wolin, “The Destructive Sixties and Postmodern Conservatism.”
\(^3\) Wolin, “The Destructive Sixties and Postmodern Conservatism.”
\(^4\) Ibid.
\(^5\) Ibid.
context: how promising is Wolin’s “fugitive democracy” in remedying the current democratic deficiencies? Specifically, how promising is the transgressive conception of democracy in terms of overcoming both right-wing populism and neo-liberal individualism?

Wolin is not alone in formulating a transgressive conception of democracy, nor is Wolin the most typical or influential thinker of radical democracy in general. What distinguishes Wolin from other thinkers of radical democracy—most notably Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, and Jacques Rancière—is first and foremost his appeal to American localist traditions of participation. As Cane (2020) argues, Wolin has a Burkean or Tocquevillian aspect that is seldom seen in other theorists of radical democracy, because Wolin emphasizes “de-centralized power or local memories, cultures, and practices” that “take root and endure over time,” while Laclau and Mouffe “focus on promoting new formations of the popular will at a symbolic level and tend not to take a stance on centralization or to stress the value of historical continuity,” and Rancière almost exclusively focuses on moments of transgression.6

Apart from being more attuned to the US context, Wolin is worth studying for a deeper reason: although Wolin is arguably not a post-structuralist or post-Marxist thinker, he adopts the post-structuralist logic to envision democratic revival in the political context of constitution-making rather than in the context of a post-constitutional political culture, so it is reasonable to view Wolin as an unavoidable entry point to evaluate the transgressive conception of democracy in the US context.

This paper is an internal critique of Wolin’s democratic theory from the external perspective of Carl Schmitt’s constitutional theory. Schmitt serves as a reference point for examining whether the radicalness of Wolin’s radical democracy is self-contradictory or even self-undermining. At first glance, it may seem impossible to draw a comparison between Wolin, the American radical leftist who argues for participatory democracy, and Schmitt, the

6 Cane, Sheldon Wolin and Democracy: Seeing through Loss, p. 7.
notorious “crown jurist of the Third Reich” commonly seen as a conservative theorist of statism. Yet given the recent literature that explores the unexplored implications of Schmitt’s work for contemporary democratic theory and even reconsiders him as potentially a radical progressive\(^7\)—especially the work of Chantal Mouffe, who basically reworks Schmitt’s critique of liberalism into agonistic pluralism—such a comparison is not unfounded. At least in the most general sense, both Wolin and Schmitt are critical of constitutional liberalism in the belief that it is not genuinely democratic. As I will elaborate in this paper, this is essentially because Wolin shares a lot with Schmitt in his conceptions of “the political,” “the people” (as \textit{demos} in the word “democracy”), and the constituent power (as \textit{kratos} in the word “democracy”). I will analyze how Wolin’s democratic theory is similar to Schmitt’s constitutional theory from the above three perspectives, as well as how Wolin can also be read as attempting to tame his Schmittian tendency and why I believe these attempts are unsatisfactory.

1. **“The Political” as “Great Refusal”**

To start with, it is worth pointing out the most significant structural similarity between Wolin and Schmitt. Just like Schmitt who distinguishes the exception from the norm and understands sovereignty as manifested only in the exception, Wolin distinguishes “the political” from “politics” and believes that democracy is only meaningful in moments of “the political.” What they share is the emphasis of another dimension of politics apart from its ordinary, mediated, and institutionalized form—this new dimension consists of events like war, rebellion, and revolution that can be seen as destroying or creating the entire conditions for normal politics. Schmitt’s rationale for making such a dichotomy is stability. He criticizes liberal parliamentarism and legal positivism because their unconditional prioritization of formal procedures and established rules might put the state in danger in times of crisis. To ensure stability

and survival in an absolute way, there has to be a strong and resolute leader who can act immediately and without constraint.

As I will argue in this section, despite the apparent structural similarity between Wolin and Schmitt, the rationale behind Wolin’s conception of “the political” is completely opposite to Schmitt’s, for it is exactly stability that Wolin seeks to disrupt with his unconventional idea of democracy. Yet only after their differences are clarified can we see the most profound affinity that Wolin shares with Schmitt—an unfounded obsession with the ultimate strife and a pessimistic denial of any improvement in the existing system.

Schmitt defines “the political” by its independence and groundlessness. “The political” is independent in the sense that the “friend-enemy” distinction is not to be mixed with any moral, economic, or aesthetic ground. A political enemy, as Schmitt defines it, need not be “morally evil” or “aesthetically ugly,” or “an economic competitor.” What makes them our enemy is only our assertion that they are “existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible.” Schmitt defines “the political” by its independence and groundlessness. “The political” is independent in the sense that the “friend-enemy” distinction is not to be mixed with any moral, economic, or aesthetic ground. A political enemy, as Schmitt defines it, need not be “morally evil” or “aesthetically ugly,” or “an economic competitor.” What makes them our enemy is only our assertion that they are “existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible.”8 A political enemy is thus a “public enemy”—here, “public” is but another word for our homogeneity that overrides all the other concerns simply for the triumph of this homogeneity. Moreover, “the political” is not necessarily in compliance with any system of “impersonal, general, and pre-established norms,”9 for the “friend-enemy” distinction is made in the state of exception, where there is an “extreme emergency” that immediately threatens the “existence of the state” and of which the details “cannot be anticipated”10—that is to say, simply put, where there can be no legal norms at all. It is from this dichotomy between exception and normality that Schmitt derives his conception of sovereignty, which is a power that “decides on the exception,”11 declares

8 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p. 27.
9 Ibid., p. 28.
10 Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, p. 10.
11 Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 6.
12 Ibid., p. 5.
war on the enemy, and makes the people survive any threat to its homogeneity. Considering that the absolute absence of norms in the state of exception requires sovereignty to be absolute as well, sovereignty is therefore “unlimited,”\textsuperscript{13} not to be hampered by checks and balances, and completely “outside the normally valid legal system.”\textsuperscript{14}

It is such independence and groundlessness that also lay the foundation for Wolin’s conception of democracy. The most striking feature of Wolin’s “fugitive democracy” is that it is a “rebellious moment” that cannot be sublimated into any form of government:

Democracy needs to be reconceived as something other than a form of government: as a mode of being which is conditioned by bitter experience, doomed to succeed only momentarily, but is a recurrent possibility as long as the memory of the political survives.\textsuperscript{15}

The moment of democracy is also the moment of “the political,” which is conceptualized by Wolin as the very opposite of “politics”—“politics” refers to the “continuous, ceaseless, and endless” activities legitimized by the public authority, while “the political” is best characterized by rare and episodic rebellion or revolution where all the established routines are totally denied. This fundamental tension between the normal and the norm-breaking is present in almost all his writings about democracy, and interestingly, democracy in the eyes of Wolin is always exclusively rooted in the norm-breaking side. To Wolin, democracy is inherently “formless” and “lawless,” and any attempt to constitutionalize or institutionalize democracy is bound to repress it instead of fulfilling it.\textsuperscript{16} The essence of democracy is therefore best articulated by the word “transgression”\textsuperscript{17}—an unrelenting will to transgress any existing order with no reason, with no telos, and simply for the sake of transgression itself.

However, from Wolin’s account that democracy is normless, it does not follow that democracy lacks any innate value. The crux of the matter is that democracy is seen by Wolin as

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 10-12.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 7.
\textsuperscript{15} Wolin, “Fugitive Democracy.”
\textsuperscript{16} Wolin, “Norm and Form.”
\textsuperscript{17} Wolin, “Transgression, Equality, and Voice,” also see “Fugitive Democracy” where Wolin argues that democracy is born in transgressive acts.
the realization of genuine equality, which is basically the political equality in a substantive sense. Wolin believes that it is far from enough, and often merely a cover for actual inequalities, to have equal rights protected by formal regulations and legally authorized procedures, nor is it feasible in reality to strive for economic equality, whether in terms of socialism or welfare-state liberalism, given the “virtually unchallengeable status of the free market and capitalism” that breed the growing inequalities of wealth and power. In short, Wolin utterly rejects the prospect that equality could ever be achieved, or at least be approached, by means of what he calls the “political economy,” a term that basically captures the state apparatus that centralizes political, economic, and technological power and is therefore “elitist in spirit, hierarchical in structure, bureaucratic in its modus operandi, and in control of formidable social resources.”

Instead, equality only exists when the “political economy” is not at work, and this is almost equivalent to saying that equality can only exist “momentarily” as a “transgression” of inequality. This inequality in the eyes of Wolin, citing the famous criticism from Kateb (2001), is “systematic and perpetuated” and “inflicts a wound or registers a fact that nothing formal or moderate or limited can heal.” I will suggest a possible explanation for Wolin’s conception of equality in the next section, but now it suffices to say that equality is seen by Wolin as a complete break with almost the entire existing order that is inevitably and hopelessly unequal. The only potentially positive element in “fugitive democracy” is therefore also norm-breaking in its essence. Nevertheless, the concept of equality does indicate why Wolin thinks that norms should be broken. His “great refusal” of all the existing norms is apparently derived from an anti-elitist spirit. It is ultimately the centralist, hierarchical, and
elitist features of the existing norms that Wolin refuses, and he refuses them uncompromisingly because he does not believe there can be any meaningful improvement within the system to turn the “modern power” towards a benign direction, given the Marxist insight that no ruling group voluntarily cedes its power.

The only way out of this predicament, as suggested by Wolin, is to let the people take back their power and thus become what he calls the “citizen-as-actor.” Underlying such an argument is actually another, perhaps more fundamental, dichotomy in Wolin’s theory of democracy: the dichotomy between active citizenship and passive citizenship. These are basically two modes of existence describing the same people—one on the hand, the people have a passive existence when they are treated as bearers of rights or consumers with fragmented preferences, so as to be ruled, managed, and exploited; on the other hand, they also have an active existence when they become “political beings” by entering into the moment of democracy. To be a passive citizen is to feel a sense of “powerlessness,” and therefore, to regain one’s power requires the abandonment of this passivity. Now we have unveiled the exact meaning of Wolin’s negative definition of democracy: at the heart of this negative definition is actually the rejection of a certain kind of citizenship, a certain way of living together, and a certain conception of who we are as a people and what we can do as a people, which are brought about by the predominance of liberal capitalism. Only by considering this practical intention can we get the positive message from Wolin’s seemingly normless conception of democracy—what Wolin seeks to bring about through his “great refusal” is a new kind of...

24 Wolin, “The People’s Two Bodies.” Also see the critique of the all-or-nothing logic in McNay, The Misguided Search for the Political: Social Weightlessness in Radical Democratic Theory, p. 165.
25 Wolin quotes this in many essays, including “Transgression, Equality, and Voice.”
26 Wolin, “Norm and Form,” p. 97, p. 84, also see “Fugitive Democracy.”
27 Wolin, “The People’s Two Bodies.” Such a distinction can be traced to Rousseau’s The Social Contract, where Rousseau distinguishes people as citizens from people as subjects: “With regard to the associates, they collectively take the name people, and individually they are called citizens as participants in the sovereign authority, and subjects as subject to the laws of the state.” See The Social Contract, 1-6.
28 For example, see Wolin, “Political Theory as a Vocation,” “Transgression, Equality, and Voice,” “What Revolutionary Action Means today.”
29 Wolin is an “epic theorist,” see Wiley, “Sheldon Wolin on Theory and the Political.”
people, who are genuinely equal to one another in the sense that they can momentarily transgress any established inequality and such transgressive moments should keep emerging and reemerging until infinity. At the heart of his conception of “the political” is therefore the prospect of emancipation, which is realized through creating a new kind of people or, to put it more accurately, through formulating a new conception of what “the people” is.

2. The Dilemma of “the People”

Who is the bearer of democracy? Of course, it is “the people,” yet there has never been a consensus in democratic theory about the exact meaning of “the people,” due to a fundamental difficulty in explaining how “a people becomes a people,” which is originally formulated by Rousseau in The Social Contract and is reformulated by Paul Ricoeur (1955), Jacques Derrida (1986), and Bonnie Honig (2007) as the paradox of politics.30 Simply put, if democracy means that the founding act of constitution-making and the subsequent interpretations, amendment, and enforcement of the constitution are ultimately attributed to people themselves, then “the people” as a collective agent is either given beforehand or performative31—either the actor creates the action or the action creates the actor. There is little controversy that Schmitt considers “the people” to be a given fact, a precondition that enables collective political action, and to quote his own terms, a homogeneous national “will” that can make “decision” with theological decisiveness. No wonder Schmitt prefers to describe “the people” as a nation32—to Schmitt, “the people” is an organic entity that is naturally unquestionable and precedes the constitution due to the prior existence of certain characteristics that are either shared or not shared within a group. It is in this regard that Wolin seems to be the

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31 For a philosophical elaboration on how the concept of performativity may be applied to the question of the people, see Jacques Derrida, “Declarations of Independence” and Jason Frank, “Unauthorized Propositions: The Federalist Papers and Constituent Power.”
32 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, p. 127. Schmitt typically refers to the people as Volk. Unlike the concept of the people, which contains “an element of indeterminacy,” the concept of Volk implies homogeneity and has been the central idea to “drive the political struggle towards national unification” of Germany in the 19th and early 20th century. See Roberto Orsi, “On the Concept of Volk in Carl Schmitt.”
opposite of Schmitt, because, as I will argue in this section, Wolin’s conception of “the people” is apparently performative. Yet despite this basic difference in their theories of the genealogy of “the people,” it can be argued at least theoretically that Wolin’s people can barely achieve anything more than Schmitt’s people.

I have argued that when Wolin refers to the people as the bearer of democracy, he is talking about the people in a specific sense—not as legal subjects or economic consumers, but rather as political actors that act in defiance of the whole ruling system. Now the question is, how could the people form a collective identity that enables them to act together? What does this collective identity look like? This is not an easy question to answer, since Wolin conceptualizes the people in two conflicting principles—commonality and plurality.

According to Wolin, the democratic moment is the moment of “commonality,” when “collective power is used to promote or protect the well-being of the collectivity.” This commonality, however, has its “boundaries” that basically work to “proclaim identity” and to “repel difference,” or in other words, to “keep citizens in” and to “keep foreigners out.” Those who are kept inside the boundaries must share a certain “likeness,” whether defined by history, culture, gender, race, or nationality. It is even assumed that among those who are similar there can be no oppression, since to be included in the boundaries is to undergo some kind of “purification.”33 There remains a lot to clarify in this apparently vague description of commonality. Most importantly, Wolin doesn’t even specify the nature and scope of the boundaries that define who the people collectively are in the democratic moment. What exactly is it that turns the “great refusal” into solidarity? The only thing we know for sure is that the basis for this commonality or the likeness that draws its boundaries cannot be found in any shared interest, shared social status, or shared opinion—that is to say, in any given condition that inevitably involves inequalities of power, wealth, and intellect.

33 Wolin, “Fugitive Democracy.”
Instead, Wolin is probably suggesting that commonality is rather created through the shared experience of acting together. “The people” is not something that already exists, like the same citizenship, the same class, or the same nationality. “The people” is performative in the sense that “we the people” can be meaningfully said only when we, through our participation in collective actions, truly experience that we are bound by the same fate, the same goals, and the same memories, regardless of all the differences in our socio-economic status. Apparently, it follows that those who are included in “the people” are only those who participate in collective actions—especially in the anti-establishment protests or rebellions, given the anti-establishment nature of Wolin’s conception of democracy. Those who are excluded from “the people” are therefore those who are not mobilized, those who are satisfied with the existing order, and those who defend the existing order, mostly for the sake of consolidating their socio-economic advantage. Now we may note that when Wolin uses the word “common” or “public,” he is actually referring not to the whole people but only to a certain part of the whole—the progressive and revolutionary part, or in Wolin’s own words, “an agonistic demos.” Perhaps we may even say that those who are excluded as pro-establishment are not to be represented, instead, they are simply to be defeated, for they are identified as the people’s enemies who are unjustly privileged, intellectually arrogant and morally irresponsible. Yet speaking practically, those who are excluded by Wolin’s conception of the people can only be defeated through a total revolution, and can only be gotten rid of momentarily before a new constitution is established. Therefore, Wolin is actually suggesting that something like the ultimate strife, or at least the perpetual possibility of this strife, is underlying his conception of “the people.” It is not hard to see that the implications of Wolin’s arguments bear a strong resemblance to Schmitt’s theory. Behind Wolin’s seemingly emancipatory project is probably a Schmittian picture of mass “acclamation,” which formulates the people’s identity in a problematic way.
To Schmitt, collective identity is embodied in a single, unified will, and such a will is most strongly and most naturally expressed in people’s “acclamation” — the “assembled multitude’s declaration of their consent or their disapproval.” “Acclamation” characterizes mass plebiscitary politics, as opposed to “secret individual votes or secret elections.”

Elections are based on each individual’s self-interested choices “through observation of a normatively regulated process” and are inevitably elitist, while acclamation is a collective event that takes place in the public sphere and often emerges spontaneously. It is true that in acclamation, there must be something shared by the people in advance, yet considering that acclamation is typically characterized by immediacy and spontaneity, it does not matter what exactly is shared and how reasonable it is — all that matters is the intensity of its outburst. In this logic, the consent of the people is most definite, most genuine, and therefore most valid when it is expressed in the most intense manner. If the people’s unity is typically found in their spontaneous acts of acclamation, then Schmitt’s conception of collective identity actually runs the risk of reducing the most reliable indicator of human capacity to the intensity of passions, as well as simplifying the condition for human collaboration to a miraculous coincidence of what is in itself disorganized and unpredictable.

To probe deeper, such a coincidence is ultimately based on the same identity, for what the people’s will reveals is nothing more than the “simple and elementary” “yes or no,” and this “yes or no” is only meant to answer the question whether someone or something belongs to the identity of a political community. The underlying premise of “acclamation” is thus clear: there has to be an essentially homogeneous people who shares a strong political identity before certain “yes or no” could spontaneously prevail. Before the friend-enemy distinction is drawn, and before the political realm is ever defined by such a distinction, the

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34 Ibid., p. 131.
35 Ibid.
homogeneity that makes people a people must already be there. Seen in this light, Schmitt’s
decisionism or voluntarism is actually grounded on an essentialist view of the people’s homo-
genecity. Yet despite the natural connections one can draw between a nation and certain geog-
raphies, culture, and ethnicity, the pre-political homogeneity is by no means natural and
might actually be constructed and enforced politically. “Democracy requires,” says Schmitt,
“first homogeneity and second—if the need arises—elimination or eradication of heterogene-
ity.”

Collective identity is therefore forced on those whose opinions do not agree with the
mainstream. By reducing the people’s voice to a mere “yes or no,” and by simplifying their
decision to inclusion or exclusion, Schmitt’s conception of collective identity also threatens
individual freedom and personal autonomy of minorities.

Now the question is: how is Schmitt’s account related to Wolin’s? It would certainly be
unfair to Wolin if we simply equate his notion of “commonality” to Schmitt’s notion of the
unified “will,” or his “boundaries” to Schmitt’s “friend-enemy” distinction. However, it is not
without reason to say that the above two points indeed have their echoes in Wolin’s argu-
ments. First, given Wolin’s view that collective identity is not given but rather created
through shared experience, he is only a step away from embracing the power of whatever the
people may unleash, and therefore, even though he does not explicitly recognize anything
that is irrational, chaotic, or merely destructive, he is actually in no position to foresee the
possible dangers that may arise from mass movements. In this sense, the democratic moment
in Wolin’s theory might in fact only be a populist moment or a demotic moment, for the
people who participate in anti-establishment movements are characterized by a “rage”—a
rage at “the injustice of elitism,” a rage “driven by resentment, envy, and rancor.”

Moreover, such a mass outbreak of demotic rage can assume the role of a Schmittian sovereign,

38 Kateb, “Wolin as a Critic of Democracy”
39 Ibid.
though in a decentralized and egalitarian manner. In Wolin’s account, we may say that the fundamental “friend-enemy” distinction is drawn between “the political” and “politics,” between democracy and constitution, and ultimately, as we have previously argued, between citizens who actively rebel and citizens who passively obey. If we also accept Schmitt’s assertion that “sovereign is he who decides on the exception” by deciding who the enemy is, does it follow that Wolin’s “agonistic demos”—the revolutionary part of the people—is the single representative for the public, the absolute criterion for the public good, and therefore the ultimate source of legitimacy for a new constitution?

It is at this point that Wolin seems to recognize and try to retreat from his inclination towards authoritarianism. Instead of advocating a kind of total revolution, he thinks it is more practical and more promising to seek the renewal of democracy in all kinds of grassroots social movements, which rests on the principle of plurality—a superficial reading would take it as the plurality of issues, as described in Wolin’s support for “low-income housing, worker ownership of factories, better schools, better health care, safer water, controls over toxic waste disposals, and a thousand other common concerns of ordinary lives,” or the plurality of identities based on religious beliefs, race, gender, or sexual orientations; yet behind all these examples, what is truly suggested by Wolin is the plurality of the “commonality,” the ambiguity of the “boundaries,” and the irreducible heterogeneity of the people inside the “boundaries.” If Wolin does not intend to rid democracy of its connotations of boundaries and commonality, how and in what sense does he incorporate the element of plurality into his conception of “the people”?

A possible reading of Wolin would be that “the people” is concrete, not abstract, and

40 Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 5.
41 Wolin, “Norm and Form: The Constitutionalizing of Democracy.”
42 Connolly, “Politics and Vision.”
43 This is because Wolin criticizes post-modern politics that rejects the collective identity of nation-states in two major ways—identity politics and transnationalism. See “Fugitive Democracy.”
dynamic, not static. On the one hand, it is concrete in the sense that it portrays each citizen as a “political being” “whose existence is located in a particular place and draws its sustenance from circumscribed relationships: family, friends, church, neighborhood, workplace, community, town, city,” and as a result, the paradigm for anti-establishment movements is not the one that totally rejects everything in the name of the whole people but often cannot meaningfully identify what is to be achieved or who is to be benefited, instead, it is better to be found at the local scale where each participant is directly responsible to one another and each has a clear understanding of the common goals as well as what it takes to achieve those goals. To conceptualize the people in concrete terms is therefore to respect diversity and heterogeneity in their actual political demands, rather than to abstract them into a political slogan which is often powerful in its force yet empty in its content. Now comes another problem: does it imply that democracy is only possible at the local scale, or that Wolin is embracing a kind of localism? If so, in what sense can we still say that the people who assemble locally for local issues are exercising the constituent power? Wolin is certainly aware of this dilemma. His major reservation about most social movements is that they are “parochial,” “locally confined,” and “politically incomplete,” for they do not address those “major problems in our society that are general in nature” and “concern us all.” Although Wolin recognizes the merits of “heterogeneity, diversity, and multiple selves,” he remains pessimistic about their actual effects, saying they are “no match for modern forms of power.” Perhaps deep in his heart, Wolin still dreams about popular movements at a broader scale, but he cannot find a viable way of going from the local to the general while preventing the local from being obliterated by the general.

On the other hand, Wolin’s conception of “the people” is dynamic, not static, which is to

45 Wolin, “What Revolutionary Action Means Today,” also see “Fugitive Democracy.”
47 Ibid.
say, there always exists an element of uncertainty or ambiguity in the meaning and the scope of “the people.” From Wolin’s attempt to incorporate plurality into commonality, we may infer that he is probably suggesting a deconstructive understanding of “the people”—“the people” is conceptualized as neither an essentialist totality nor an aggregation of essentialist individuals, or in other words, the notion of the people denotes neither a changeless entity nor a mere illusion—but what exactly does it mean to speak of the people in Wolin’s way?

Dallmayr’s (2018) interpretation portrays Wolin as transcending the conflict between liberal individualism and republican populism, and as standing on the same line with post-modern thinkers, most notably Laclau, Mouffe, and Derrida, who seek to transform modern subjectivity into decentred and detotalized agency. A post-modern conception of “the people,” according to Dallmayr, “is not a fixed or static identity but rather the emblem of human self-transformation and maturation, of the striving for self-rule that always remains a task and a challenge.”

The impetus to such an ongoing transformation is the transgressive acts carried out by “creative and brave minorities” who are culturally or historically labeled as “others” by the dominant interpretation of the people, and through their acts of transgression, are also inviting the mainstream people to reconsider who they themselves really are. It is not hard to see that what underlies this account is basically the ongoing extension of democratic inclusion, which is enabled by an ongoing development of multiculturalist learning experience. However, it remains unclear whether “the people” in Wolin’s account allows the space for any democratic learning experience to take root and accumulate—after all, as we have previously argued, his conception of “the people” is best characterized by a “fugitive” outburst of demotic “rage” that somehow resembles a Schmittian picture of mass “acclamation,” and most fundamentally, by an uncompromising rejection to every single bit of the established order. Even though Wolin probably takes a non-essentialist or dynamic view on the people’s

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48 Dallmayr, “Beyond Fugitive Democracy: Some Modern and Postmodern Reflections.”
49 Ibid., also see Connolly, “Politics and Vision.”
collective identity, he is actually unwilling, or perhaps unable, to explain how the transformation might happen and where it might lead us in the long run.

3. The Constituent Power: Decentralized or Dissolved?

Not only does Wolin rework Schmitt’s theory of what it means to form a collective identity, but Wolin also has an implicit theory of the constituent power that yields interesting findings when compared with Schmitt’s constitutional theory. In the last section of this paper, I will move from examining what “the people” is to examining how the power (kratos) of “the people” (demos) is understood. In the context of democracy where “the people” is deemed to have the supreme authority over established institutions in a way that could justify or challenge their legality, the power of “the people” is also known as the constituent power—according to Colón-Ríos’ (2017) historical analysis, this term can be traced back to the English revolutionary debates in the seventeenth century, but it is Emmanuel Sieyès who first formulates the famous distinction between the constituent power and the constituted power. Basically, the constituent power is the power to create a constitution and to amend the existing constitution when necessary, while the constituted power, which refers to established institutions like governments and legislatures, is only derived from the constitution and is therefore amenable to change. Throughout history, the locus of the constituent power has evolved from the Crown to the Parliament, to local representatives in British colonies, and ultimately, to the people. If the word “constitution” here is understood not only in terms of particular constitutional laws but rather in a more general and substantive sense, the constituent power can be seen as having a certain political quality, although the discussions about it are mostly found in legal scholarship—as concluded by Colón-Ríos (2017), the constituent power is arguably characterized by a “transformative impulse,” or “a force that challenges juridical systems from the outside and that, even when institutionalized, might re-emerge at any moment to
destabilize it.”

What is shared by Wolin and Schmitt is that they both place the essence of democracy in the constituent power rather than in the constituted power. They would stand on the same line if we accept the famous distinction made by Kalyvas (2005)—the distinction between two genealogies of the concept of sovereignty: besides the “absolute and perpetual power” of command that enforces obedience and represses disobedience, which can be traced to the writings of Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes, there is an alternative definition that understands sovereignty not from a top-down perspective but rather from a bottom-up perspective, that is to say, “not as the ultimate coercive power of command but instead as the power to found, to posit, to constitute, that is, as a constituting power,” which is probably created by Marsilius of Padua and can be found in the works of revolutionary thinkers like John Locke, Thomas Paine, and Emmanuel Sieyès. The fundamental similarity between Wolin and Schmitt is that they both belong to the second camp. In this sense, they agree that the power of the people is realized not through the exercise of their legal rights that are recognized and protected by the law, but rather through their disregard for the law in a way that questions the very foundation on which the law is built.

Despite this essential similarity, there are two important structural differences that deserve our attention. The constituent power in Schmitt’s account remains “alongside and above the constitution” after the act of constitution-making, yet Wolin sees the constituent power as neither alongside nor above the constituted power. From the word “alongside,” it is implied that the constituent power continues to exist after it makes the constitution. That is to say, the constituent power is not “expended and eliminated” by its one-time exercise, or to put it more vividly, the constituent power does not make the constitution in the same way as a

50 Colón-Ríos, “Five Conceptions of Constituent Power.”
51 Kalyvas, “Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power.”
53 Ibid., p. 125.
chrysalis dies in giving birth to a fly.\textsuperscript{54} A crucial implication of this theory is that the people can overthrow the existing constitution and re-establish a new one at any time and for any reason. It is at this point that radical democratic theory can be distinguished from liberal democratic theory. For the liberal thinkers who believe that there is always a right to revolution even after people have explicitly or tacitly consented to the government—most notably John Locke, it is only after the government has repeatedly abused its power and obviously inflicted enough suffering on the general public that the constituent power can be appropriately invoked, so that the constitution cannot be changed at the people’s whim. Schmitt’s theory is therefore radical in the sense that there is no normative guardrail against the ever-present possibility of the exercise of the constituent power.

Contrary to Schmitt, Wolin believes that the constituent power is exhausted by the act of constitution-making. This is most evident in the following quote, where the aforementioned dichotomy between the constituent power and the constituted power is reformulated by Wolin as the dichotomy between revolution and constitution:

One is the settled structure of politics and governmental authority typically called a constitution, and the other is the unsettling political movement typically called revolution. Stated somewhat starkly: constitution signifies the suppression of revolution; revolution, the destruction of constitution.\textsuperscript{55}

He also mentions elsewhere that:

Revolutions and constitutions are events that seem to presuppose and to oppose each other. Each represents an extraordinary concentration of pure political power. Between the two they account for political power in its two primal forms. The one is the power to overthrow a political order, the other the authority to empower a new one. Each causes the other to disappear; each disappears into the other.\textsuperscript{56}

To Wolin, democracy is typically found in moments of revolution, and the revolutionary element of revolution is by nature ephemeral in the sense that it is self-destructing—when

\textsuperscript{54} Colón-Ríos, “Five Conceptions of Constituent Power.”
\textsuperscript{55} Wolin, “Norm and Form: The Constitutionalizing of Democracy”
revolution destroys an old constitution and settles down into a new constitution, its revolutionary element becomes institutionalized, regularized, and routinized. What is marked by the success of revolution is not “the fulfilment of democracy” but rather “the beginning of its attenuation.” The constituent power, which essentially means democracy in Wolin’s theory, therefore cannot persist after it has taken effect and fulfilled its role. Or, to put it more accurately, the constituent power continues to exist not by persisting “alongside” the constitution for the people to invoke whenever they wish, but rather by constantly and unpredictably re-emerging from the people every time it becomes exhausted by the constitution-making act. Seen in this light, Wolin is actually far from returning to the liberal tradition that either understands the exercise of the people’s constituent power as a one-off activity or sets up normative guardrails for its recurrent emergence. What he has in mind is but a different version of how the constituent power remains “alongside” the constitution.

The second difference concerns the relationship between the constituent power and the constituted power. Schmitt describes the constituent power as “above” the constitution, in the sense that the constituent power is the ultimate condition for the constituted power to exist consistently and reliably. To Schmitt, the true purpose of recognizing the legitimacy of the constituent power is to ensure that the constituted power, which is basically derived from the established legal rules, could survive the extreme situation where all the legal rules are suspended. Unlike Schmitt, who considers the constituent power as a necessary supplement to the constituted power, Wolin describes these two powers as mutually hostile, with one’s gain being the other’s loss. This scenario of mutual confrontation is based on a specific understanding of the nature of power that can be sorted out from Wolin’s political thought—power

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57 Ibid.
58 For example, in the 17th century, the Crown’s constituent power in British colonies should abdicate itself and give way to limited legislatures; the right of resistance that is theoretically granted to the people in the 18th century cannot take place unless the government has repeatedly abused its power, which allows the juridical order to be rightfully overthrown. See Colón-Rios, “Five Conceptions of Constituent Power.”
as opposition, or power in the context of conflict.

Power is a keyword in Wolin’s theory—the modern state operates in a way that makes people feel powerless, and democracy is realized only when people somehow take back their power. It is also implied that equality, which is considered by Wolin as the ultimate value of democracy, actually refers to the equal share of power. The notion of power therefore lies at the heart of Wolin’s conception of democracy, or more precisely speaking, of what the people can possibly do at the democratic moment. If the people in Wolin’s usage are basically characterized by their participation in anti-establishment movements, it follows that the people’s collective power is understood in terms of opposition, or in other words, the growing power of the state must make the people powerless, while the people must rebel against the state in order to take their power back. What underlies this conception of power is an inherent link between power and conflict—power becomes manifest whenever conflict arises, and conflict is always resolved in favor of the more powerful side. It is nothing new in political theory to think of power as force or coercion that is associated with conflict. Perhaps Schmitt offers one of the most extreme accounts in this regard. To Schmitt, the real conflict between “friend” and “enemy” is never about economic interests, moral values, or aesthetic tastes, which more or less allow the possibility of negotiation and compromise, but it is rather about survival, so the ultimate conflict between “friend” and “enemy” is articulated as an ever present and the most extreme possibility of “war.” Most notably, the possibility of “war” must be understood in a “concrete and existential” sense, for it entails “the real possibility of physical killing” in “a real combat situation with a real enemy,” who threatens to kill us immediately and shows absolutely no willingness to communicate. In this scenario, power is

60 Wolin, “Norm and Form: The Constitutionalizing of Democracy.”
61 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, pp. 34-5.
62 Ibid., p. 27.
63 Ibid., p. 33.
64 Ibid., p. 49.
only gained by being stronger, more resolute, and more unscrupulous than your enemies.

If Wolin also understands political power in terms of opposition, and if the constituent power is opposed to the constituted power in the same way as one is faced with a Schmittian enemy, then what does the constituent power look like and how effective it is in countering the constituted power and thereby raising the hope of emancipation? Before setting out to explore these two notions in Wolin’s theory, it is worth bearing in mind a question that concerns my current interest in the meaning of power—is the constituent power of the same kind as the constituted power? If they are not even commensurable, then in what sense can we meaningfully set them in contrast, and in what sense is the constituent power a possible way of resistance?

Wolin has offered a rich discussion on the constituted power under the term “modern power,” showing how it might lead to a disguised version of totalitarianism. The figure who stands at the center of his conception of “modern power” is Hobbes. What Wolin takes from Hobbes in his understanding of modernization can be summarized into two interrelated processes—“centralization” of the state and “privatization” of the people, which describe how the constituted power operates in principle. On the one hand, “modern power” works by strengthening the state’s control over the people through “the mobilization and direction of human energies and skills for productive work,” as well as through “state subsidies for scientific research and technological development”65 which aim at exploiting human labor with the utmost efficiency. On the other hand, “modern power” also works by “depoliticizing” the people in a way that makes everyone “see himself as politically protected rather than politically engaged” and, as a result, reduce all his political concerns to what is his “own.”66 These two processes, as I infer, are seen by Wolin as exactly what underlie the modern projects of

66 Ibid.
state-building, as well as the modern concepts of property rights and legitimacy. It is therefore not paradoxical that Wolin portrays the modern citizenry as “simultaneously defended and exploited, protected and extracted, nurtured and fleeced, rewarded and commanded, flattered and threatened”—perhaps what he has in mind is better expressed as “defended in order to be exploited,” “protected in order to be extracted,” and so forth. Worse still, Wolin takes a step further than Hobbes and suggests that “modern power,” which, from the above analysis, only denotes the power of the ruling system, is also continuously produced by the citizens themselves once they become “disposed” to actively support the system. In general, the constituted power is apparently invincible and ubiquitous, for it not only builds on the centralization of human and material resources but also gets internalized into people’s consciousness.

In contrast, the constituent power is the power of the ruled who resist being ruled. It conceptualizes the people not as individual subjects but rather as “democratic collective actors.” At this point, Wolin draws on Spinoza—particularly his concepts of conatus (striving) and multitudo (the multitude), which are echoed by the two most distinctive features in Wolin’s conception of collective action. First, we may recall that in Spinoza’s philosophy, conatus means infinite striving for self-preservation and is defined as the “actual essence” of each “finite mode” (Ethics, 3P6-8). What fascinates Wolin is probably the idea that something infinite could come out of our finite existence, or in other words, our finite existence is essentially characterized by our striving which is directed at challenging, if not transcending, our own finitude. Second, to portray the people as multitudo is to deny the Hobbesian ideal of centralized unity, as well as to recognize “a plurality which persists as such in the public

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67 Ibid., Wolin even refers to legitimacy as “the legitimating myth.”
68 Wolin, “Fugitive Democracy.”
69 Wolin, “The People’s Two Bodies,” also see “Constitutional Order, Revolutionary Violence, and Modern Power: An Essay of Juxtapositions,” where Wolin argues that the individual is both producer and citizen, a producer of power and a producer of legitimacy.
71 Ibid.
scene, in collective action, in the handling of communal affairs, without converging into a One.” Taking these two concepts together, we may interpret Wolin’s conception of the people’s power as the striving of the multitude, but two things remain unclear—in what sense does Wolin think the people’s power can exceed the “modern power” that is imposed on them? Moreover, is there anything that the people’s power is supposed to constitute so that it may be called the constituent power properly?

In Wolin’s writings, the answers for the above questions are only hinted at rather than fully explored, but interestingly, we may detect two different ways in which the people could somehow overpower the system—one is revolution, the other has no specific name but is often described by Wolin as “creativity.” I have already elaborated on the logic behind revolution, which can be summarized as “opposition”—revolution takes place when the people want to overthrow the existing constitution, and revolution succeeds only when the people actually defeat the constituted power. Revolution thus calls for a decisive battle—a direct, bodily, and usually bloody conflict, through which the current system is totally destroyed so that another constitution will be established anew. If the people can be seen as overpowering the system, their power is essentially of the same kind as that of the system, for it tends to be, or often ends up being, a power that is concrete, centralized, and violent, otherwise how is it possible that it can actually defeat the constituted power? However, given the obvious fact that the state apparatus is characterized not only by its centralization of wealth and administrative power, but also by its monopoly of military force to which the ordinary people are certainly no rival, to oppose it by playing hardball would probably either fail in a way like suicide or trigger the vicious cycle of oppression.

Wolin is probably aware of the above difficulties within the logic of opposition, for another strategy for resistance can be discerned from his thought. I name it “creation” because

72 Virno, A Grammar of the Multitude.
Wolin often refers to it by the word “creativity.” What he has in mind for the paradigm of “creation” is the 60s movement, which, in his words, is “not solely about the Vietnam War” but also “about racism, imperialism, professionalism, affluence, moral codes, orthodox notions of sexuality and gender, and much more, from junk food to slick culture.”

Behind the multiple dimensions of this movement is ultimately the multiple dimensions of collective power—it is at this point that Wolin invokes the concept of multitudo from Spinoza, and he invokes it in at least two distinct ways. First, collective power has multiple origins such as family, school, church, and workplace, which means it “is located in a particular place and draws its sustenance from circumscribed relationships” just like our concrete existence does. Unlike revolution that seeks a single extraordinary act of constitution-making, this new strategy identifies the people’s power in their tiny practices of normal and ordinary life.

Second, collective power can take multiple forms—apart from being material, in terms of which it is no match for the constituted power, it can also be symbolic and psychological:

> For true political power involves not only acting so as to effect decisive changes; it also means the capacity to receive power, to be acted upon, to change, and be changed. From a democratic perspective, power is not simply force that is generated; it is experience, sensibility, wisdom, even melancholy distilled from the diverse relations and circles we move within.

In this sense, the people become revolutionary not because their power is violent, but because they can create a power that is different in kind from the constituted power. Wolin has never specified this new kind of power in detail, but a possible reading would suggest that it should be seen as an alternative to the conventional conception of the constituent power. From this alternative view, what the people actually constitute is not a new constitutional order, which is but another ruling system that still operates through explicit or implicit violence. To break this deadlock of violence, perhaps what really needs to be constituted is something that works

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74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
on the level of people’s consciousness—something that might encourage them to reconsider what has been familiar or indisputable, as well as to imagine new ways of building meaningful links with one another. This, in the end, requires us to view the concept of “the political” in a new light. Instead of following Schmitt in making “the political” independent of moral, economic, and aesthetic considerations, or following Wolin who somehow echoes Schmitt in his unstated belief that our political life takes priority over everything else in defining our worth and dignity, it might be a better idea to incorporate poems, dramas, movies, subcultures, opinions from all walks of life, and insights from all the other disciplines into our imagination of new political communities.

Once the people is dissolved into the multitude, and their collective power is diversifying into daily acts of multifaceted “creation,” it seems that the fundamental dichotomy in Wolin’s democratic theory—the dichotomy between democracy and constitution, or between the people and the system—appears to be not so much a single decisive battle as an ongoing war with complex interactions. Perhaps Wolin’s thought is potentially related to anarchism, which has the idea that resistance is more effective when it somehow suspends the constituted power by dodging its coercion, mocking at its authority, and showing a tactical flexibility when dealing with it.76 Wolin, in his attempt to tame the Schmittian tendency in his thought, ends up formulating the constituent power as embodied in all kinds of social movements that are mobilized creatively and endlessly at the local scale.

Now the remaining questions are: can power as “creation” still be called the constituent power properly? What exactly is it that the people constitute by exercising the constituent power? Is “constitution” still a meaningful political concept with clear definitions of authorization and accountability when it becomes so generalized that it includes arts, cultures, subcultures, or whatever that works on people’s political consciousness? Most perplexing is that

76 See, for example, James Scott (2009).
at the end of my analysis, the very idea of “the political,” along with the very idea of democracy that is built on the “great refusal” of all existing norms, becomes dubious—it remains to be explored whether the ultimate strife between the people and the system is decentralized and multiplied in a way that everybody could be accused of being the enemy of democracy in any aspect of life and for no publicly debatable reason, or this ultimate strife, from which my whole interpretation of Wolin’s political thought begins, is rather disarmed and diluted into apolitical matters that can hardly be seen as having political significance unless the project of consciousness-raising is actually effective. Yet Wolin offers no account of where he thinks “creation” might lead us. It is therefore not unfair to conclude that, if Wolin’s theory can be read as suggesting an alternative conception of the constituent power, it is either an abandonment of the constituent power or a harbinger of a populist form of the Schmittian sovereign.

4. Concluding Remarks

I have argued in this paper how Wolin’s democratic theory is similar to Schmitt’s constitutional theory in the conceptions of “the political,” “the people,” and the constituent power, as well as how Wolin can be read as attempting to tame his Schmittian tendency by reworking “the political” into an emancipatory concept, by disintegrating “the people” into a performative and plural category, and by reformulating the constituent power from collective opposition against the state to individual creation at the grassroots. I have also argued that, at least theoretically, Wolin’s attempts to avoid leaning towards the Schmittian sovereign are unsatisfactory, for deep inside, Wolin still shares with Schmitt an unfounded obsession with the ultimate strife, a pessimistic denial of any improvement in the existing system, and a decisionist understanding of human beings that reduces the most reliable indicator of human capacity to the intensity of passions and simplifies the condition for human collaboration to the same identity, the result being that Wolin can only place his hope for democracy on the continual revival of transgressive populist movements, whose role in the long-term development
of democracy remains dubious. There are thus two contrasting images of Wolin as a democratic theorist—a Schmittian populist on the one hand, and a post-structuralist critic of Schmitt on the other hand. My conclusion is that Wolin remains fundamentally Schmittian despite his differences with Schmitt, because the latter Wolin cannot resolve the difficulties raised by the former Wolin.

One would naturally ask: where exactly does Wolin’s democratic theory go wrong? This question is addressed in this paper from three interrelated perspectives—“the political,” “the people,” and the constituent power. It is true that each perspective is plagued by certain inherent difficulties, but there is no denying that Wolin indeed reworks these concepts in the right direction—after all, from a progressive perspective, what can be wrong with emancipation? What can be wrong with abandoning essentialism for a constructive and pluralist understanding of the people? What can be wrong with raising political consciousness in every aspect of life? For further analysis, perhaps it can be argued that there are unintended consequences that could harm democracy when these progressive elements are piled together. A constructive and pluralist understanding of the people does not necessarily encourage solidarity across classes and identities, unless it is accompanied by a widespread sensitivity that treats difference with empathy rather than with hostility, which is unlikely to exist if the ultimate strife between the people and the system (or to put it more accurately, between the anti-establishment people and the pro-establishment people) along with the uncompromising attitude is applied indiscriminately to social and personal issues. Moreover, pitting the people against the system is not necessarily conducive to productive conflict that would hopefully lead to emancipation, unless it is accompanied by a clear sense of boundaries that does not extend what is done to enemies to potential friends or how non-negotiable matters are handled to negotiable matters, which is unlikely to exist if the definition of the people is made infinitely ambiguous and the political consciousness of the general public becomes easily aroused and
manipulated. Finally, a widespread political consciousness in every aspect of life does not necessarily prepare the soil for democracy to take root and grow in the long run, unless it is accompanied by a persistent positive belief in what the people are resisting the ruling system for, which is unlikely to exist if the overwhelming public sentiment is characterized by hatred due to the ultimate strife between the people and the system, as well as by insecurity due to the ever-changing conception of who the people properly are.

The above is only a tentative explanation for why Wolin’s democratic theory cannot be both coherent in theory and effective in practice, despite his intentional or unintentional attempts to rework his similarities with Schmitt’s constitutional theory. For those who wish to follow Wolin’s lead, these difficulties cannot be overlooked. For those who wish to rediscover Schmitt’s potential worth to radical democratic theory, Wolin serves as an exemplar of how far they can go and how likely they can truly advance what they want without accepting what they do not want.
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