Former Fellow Debra Javeline Publishes Article on Insurance Incentives and Coastal Vulnerability

Author: Kristian Olsen

Debra Javeline Ndias Headshot 2020 March 600x750

Debra Javeline, 2019-2020 NDIAS Fellow and Notre Dame Associate Professor of Political Science, has published an article based on her NDIAS research. The article, entitled "Do Perverse Insurance Incentives Encourage Coastal Vulnerability?" was published in Natural Hazards Review and is co-authored by Tracy Kijewski-Correa and Angela Chesler.

Abstract: Subsidized insurance is often described as a perverse incentive, moral hazard, or maladaptation that perpetuates coastal residencies in vulnerable homes despite increasing safety and economic risks from hurricanes, sea level rise, and other climate change impacts. Insurance is also often described as a positive factor in coastal risk reduction if insurers proactively reward homeowners for upgrades that mitigate losses from hurricanes. The empirical and policy-relevant question remains whether homeowners perceive insurance incentives as perverse or positive. A new survey of 662 North Carolina coastal homeowners shows that most are failing to upgrade their homes to address hurricane risk or plan for coastal retreat but not because they expect insurance to cover losses. Rather those aware of insurance incentives are more likely to live in better-protected residences and take the incentivized actions. Limited awareness of existing policies suggests a need for greater outreach by policymakers, lenders, and insurers.


Originally published by Kristian Olsen at on November 11, 2021.